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We derive a model of endogenous growth with physical capital, human cap-
ital, and technological progress through quality-ladders. We introduce welfare-
decreasing pollution in the model, which can be reduced through the develop-
ment of cleaner technologies. From the quantitative analysis of the model, we
show clear evidence that the new externality from technological progress to pol-
lution considered in this model is suﬃciently strong to induce underinvestment
in R&D as an outcome of the decentralized equilibrium. An important policy
implication of the main result of this article is a justiﬁcation to subsidize the
research in cleaner technologies.
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21 Introduction
Economic growth is often associated with signiﬁcant environmental problems, since
it is typically accompanied by increases in natural resource use and in undesirable
pollutant emissions. The environmental damages unleashed by economic development
are not only harmful per se, but also diminish future growth prospects through the
degradation of basic productive assets, such as soil, water and the atmosphere, that
are essential for human activities, thus calling into question the sustainability of such
growth. It has long been clear that one way out of this conundrum is to develop new
technologies, especially those that bring positive economic productivity eﬀects and are
also environmentally friendly.
Initially, technical progress was incorporated into growth models exogenously, which
showed its potential beneﬁts but didn’t explain how it occurred. More recently there
has been a proliferation of studies of endogenous technical change, which analyse the
interaction between choices in the dynamic economic system and technological develop-
ment. Some of these studies include environmental variables in the analysis. Smulders
[28] is an excellent non-technical summary of the evolution of technology’s role in
growth models with natural resources, which points out that the form of technological
change is crucial and that, given the costs of technological improvements, appropriate
regulation is essential to ensure that such change will continue ”at a suﬃcient rate and
in the right direction” (pg. 172).1
L¨ oschel [?] presents an overview of economic models of environmental policy that
incorporate technological change, both exogenous and endogenous. The author em-
phasizes the overwhelming evidence for endogenous technological change, especially
over a long time horizon, although he highlights the complexities inherent to the in-
clusion of such endogeneity in policy models. A more recent survey, focusing on models
for climate policy analysis, is Gillingham, Newell, and Pizer [10].
As Jaﬀe, Newell, and Stavins [15] make clear, both technological innovation and
pollution are characterized by market failures leading to a number of well-known exter-
nalities. The negative eﬀects of pollution fall (wholly or partly) on third parties that
1Some authors recognize that not all technology is good for the environment. For instance, both
Bovenberg and Smulders [5] and Ikazaki [14] consider distortions in models with pollution-augmenting
technological change. More recently, Cunha-e-S´ a, Leitao and Reis [7] develop a model which distin-
guishes clean and dirty technological change.
3are not involved in the pollution-producing decision, thus creating an environmental
externality. As for technology, there are knowledge externalities arising from one ﬁrm’s
costly investment in new technology, creating beneﬁcial spillovers for other ﬁrms, since
new knowledge has a public-good nature.There may also be adoption externalities if
one ﬁrm’s use of a technology lowers costs for other ﬁrms, through learning eﬀects
or network externalities. This double market failure diminishes private incentives for
the development of green technologies and strengthens the case for government in-
tervention, preferably through the application of combined policies instead of single
instruments.2
In this paper, we provide a quantiﬁcation of externalities in an endogenous growth
model with pollution-diminishing R&D and human capital accumulation. In our
model, improvements in technological quality mean fewer emissions, i.e. a cleaner
technology. Furthermore, we show that considering pollution in an endogenous growth
model with physical capital, human capital, and R&D introduces distortions, not only
on the allocation of resources throughout sectors in the economy, but also on output
and capital growth rates. We quantify these distortions by means of a calibration
exercise. The negative eﬀect of R&D on pollution is an additional externality, which
drives the decentralized equilibrium further from the social optimum and adds an extra
reason to obtain underinvestment in R&D. In this sense, this paper also contributes
to a large literature on the optimality of investments in R&D (for a good revision see
Alvarez, Paleaz, and Groth [3]).
The following section presents the model, whereas section 3 shows the main rela-
tionships between variables from a social planner’s point of view. Section 4 presents
the decentralized equilibrium. Section 5 presents the allocations of human capital and
other macroeconomic variables and shows the distortions in the market solution. In
section 6 we calibrate the model and quantify the distortions presented in the previous
section, whereas section 7 concludes.
2The authors also refer the problem of incomplete information as an additional reason for slow
diﬀusion of better technologies. This market failure may explain, for instance, the widespread under-
investment in energy-saving technologies.
42 Model
We build an endogenous growth model of a closed economy with physical and human
capital accumulation as well as quality-improving R&D (quality-ladders or vertical
R&D), to which we add utility-decreasing pollution. The ﬂow of pollution emissions
arises from production in the economy and decreases with the quality index for tech-
nologies. The higher the technology index, the cleaner is the technology used in the
economy.
2.1 Production Factors and Final Goods
2.1.1 Capital Accumulation
The accumulation of physical capital (KP) in the economy arises through production
that is not consumed, and is subject to depreciation:
˙ KP = Y ¡ C ¡ ±PKP (1)
where Y denotes production of ﬁnal goods, C is consumption, and ±P represents
depreciation.
We propose that human capital KH is produced using human capital allocated to
schooling, according to:
˙ KH = »HH ¡ ±HKH (2)
where HH are school hours, » > 0 is a parameter that measures productivity inside
schools, and ±H ¸ 0 is the depreciation of human capital.
Individual human capital can be divided into skills in ﬁnal good production (HY),
school attendance (HH), and doing R&D (HR). Assuming that the diﬀerent human
capital activities aren’t done cumulatively, we have:
KH = HY + HH + HR (3)
52.1.2 R&D Technology
Technological capital, or new qualities of the current technology, QR, are produced in
a R&D sector with human capital employed in R&D labs (HR) and using the current
quality (QR). At each point in time, an improvement from the quality level k to k +1
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where ¸ measures duplication (”stepping-on-toes”) eﬀects and 0 < Á < 1 measures
the degree of spillover externalities in R&D across time, as in Jones (1995).
2.1.3 Final Good Production




P, ¯ < 1, ´ > 0 (5)
where A 2 [0;1] is an index of the technology production potential in a given period
of time. Thus A approaches 1 if the economy is approaching it production frontier.
















The elasticity of substitution between varieties is measured by 0 < ® < 1. xi is the
intermediate good i and is produced in a diﬀerentiated goods sector using human
capital: xi = HYxi.















ki is an aggregate quality index:
2.2 Consumers

















where ½ is the utility discount rate, b > 0 gives the level of disutility that a consumer
has from pollution, · > 1 describes the intensity of the pollution eﬀect in welfare. This
parameter means that the eﬀect of pollution is increasing in its level, as high levels of
pollution is proportionally more damaging than low levels of pollution.3 P is pollution
















Pollution increases signiﬁcantly with production, specially since Â > 1, which
means that higher values of A mean more production but also more pollution. As
the economy approaches the technological frontier, pollution increases. On the other
hand, new cleaner technologies decrease pollution. The eﬀect of Q²
R in pollution is
crucial as it means that high technological knowledge decreases pollution.
3 Optimal Growth
It is clear that when assets directly provide utility, while simultaneously acting as
inputs to the production function, the decentralized equilibrium will in general not
3The t subscripts are dropped in the remaining sections for ease of notation.
7maximize aggregate welfare. Thus we must solve a social planner’s problem. In this
section we derive the conditions associated with the maximization of (8) subject to
the production function (5) as well as the transition equations for the diﬀerent types
of capital (1), (2), and (4).

























Y ¡ C ¡ ±PKP
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+ (10)










where the ¸j are the co-state variables for each stock Kj; with j = P;H and QR:
Considering choice variables A, C, HY, and HR (and substituting HH for KH¡HY ¡HR
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@C = C¡ 1
¿ representing the marginal utility of consumption.
3.1 Optimal Growth Rates
Growth rates will, by deﬁnition, be constant, so equation (1) tells us that KP, Y , and
C all grow at the same rate. Furthermore, KH and all its components will also be
growing at that same rate, respecting equations (2) and (3).
Denote the growth rate of technological capital as gQR and the growth rate of
human capital as gKH: From equation (4) we can see that these two growth rates have
to respect the following relation: gKH =
(1¡Á)
¸ gQR.
In the steady-state, we can obtain the human capital growth rate as follows. From
(13) we ﬁnd g¸H = g¸P + gY ¡ gKH and using equation (16) we can then replace
the previous two equations into ¡1
¿gY =
˙ ¸P







gY = gKH + ½ + ±H ¡ » (18)
To simplify the above expression, we log-diﬀerentiate equation (7) and substitute
in this result the formula for gA, which we get from (12), we then get:
gY
·
(1 ¡ ¯) +
µ 1





























































Using the fact that gQR = ¸




































































































































































































































The derivation of the growth rates in the decentralized equilibrium are in Appendix
B.
4 Decentralized Equilibrium
In the decentralized equilibrium both consumers and ﬁrms make choices that maximize,

























subject to the budget constraint:
:
a = (r ¡ ±p)a + WHHH ¡ C (25)
where a represents the family physical assets, r is the return on physical capital, and
WH is the market wage. The market price for the consumption good is normalized
to 1. Since it is making an intertemporal choice, the family also takes into account
equation (2) which represents human capital accumulation.4
The markets for purchased production factors are assumed to be competitive. From

















4See Appendix A for the ﬁrst order conditions in the decentralized equilibrium.


























where T is a constant tax rate which ﬁrms have to pay to the Government due to
pollution they incur in their production process. This imply that in the decentralized
equilibrium gY = gP:
Each ﬁrm in the intermediate goods sector owns an inﬁnitely-lived patent for selling
its variety xi. Producers of diﬀerentiated goods act under monopolistic competition
in which they sell their own variety of the intermediate capital good xi and maximize
operating proﬁts, ¼i:
¼i = (pi ¡ wH)xi; (30)
where pi denotes the price of intermediate good i and r is the unit cost of xi. The
demand for each intermediate good results from the maximization of proﬁts in the
ﬁnal goods sector. Proﬁt maximization in this sector implies that each ﬁrm charges a
price of:
pi = p = wH=®: (31)






















Taking into account the cost of an innovation as determined by equation (4), free-entry
























QR = 0 (HR = 0): (35)
Finally, the no-arbitrage condition requires that investing in patents has the same




= (r ¡ ±P) ¡ ¼=º: (36)














4.1 Growth Rates in the Decentralized Equilibrium
In the steady-state, we can obtain the human capital growth rate of the decentralized
equilibrium as follows. By using equation(49) and replacing it in g¸
0
H = g¸a + gW
which we get by (47), we ﬁnd
˙ ¸a
¸a = ½+±H ¡» ¡gW. From (27)we get gW = gY ¡gKH.










gY + gKH = » ¡ ½ ¡ ±H (37)
13By log-diﬀerentiating the production function (26), using the fact that gQR =
¸
1¡ÁgKH, and that by equation gP = gY (29), and an assumed constant tax rate in the
















































By using the fact that gQR = ¸



































































5 Optimality of Human Capital Allocations













































































The equations that were presented in this section provide a basis for the comparison
between the optimal solution with the decentralized equilibrium solution.5 In fact, this
model incorporates several reasons why the decentralized equilibrium solution may be
diﬀerent from the social planner solution:
² The creative destruction eﬀect - or the probability of success of an innovation
is internalized by the social planner but not by the agents in the decentralized
equilibrium. An increasing rate of creative destruction reduces the time span





and increases the eﬀort in R&D in the market.
² Spillovers in R&D - the R&D activity depends on past knowledge. This is a
positive eﬀect that ﬁrms do not internalize. It contributes to the sub-optimallity
of R&D and is measured by Á:
5A detailed explanation of the calculation of these shares can be found in Appendix B. In the
calibration section we also calculate uR and uY separately, using the fact that uR + uY + uH = 1:
15² Duplication eﬀects in R&D - Some R&D eﬀorts would be redundant in compari-
son with others. This eﬀect will contribute to a higher eﬀort in the decentralized
equilibrium than the social planner would do. This is measured by ¸:
² Specialization gains from R&D - Having better qualities available increases pro-
duction and welfare, which is an eﬀect that is not internalized by ﬁrms. It is
measured by ´ > ®:
² Externality from Pollution - the lower the eﬀect of the technological index A in
pollution and the higher the eﬀect of the technological quality index, the higher
the allocation of human capital to R&D in the optimal solution. It is measured
by Â (the eﬀect of the technological index A in pollution) and ² (the eﬀect of the
technological quality index in pollution).
Contrary to what happens in some previous papers, here, due to the introduction
of pollution, growth rates in the social planner solutions also deviate from the decen-
tralized equilibrium solution. However, as we could see in the following sections, these
deviations are relatively less important than those in shares. As usual in the studies
that intend to evaluate distortions between the social planner and decentralized equi-
librium solutions, this evaluation is a quantitative issue. Thus we now implement a
calibration exercise to evaluate the distortions.
6 Results and Calibration
6.1 Calibration Procedure
In this section, we present and justify the calibrated values for the parameters. For
the share of physical capital in the ﬁnal good production, we use the typical value,
¯ = 0:36: For the markup in the diﬀerentiated goods sector (1=®), we have based on
Norrbin [22] to use a value of 1=® = 1:33: We use the output growth rate of Western
Europe in the period from 1973 to 2001, reported by Maddison, as a base for our
calibration exercise [21]. As in Strulik [32], we use the TFP growth rate to estimate
16the growth rate of R&D, using the facts that gKP = gY and gKH =
1¡Á
¸ gQR: Using the
values already deﬁned we reach that gQR = 0:006532: Following the approach of Strulik,
we estimate the parameter of innovation ° such that the lifetime of an innovation is
20 years. This implies that ° = 1:0418: For the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
(¿), we follow Jones at. al. [19] in considering ¿ = 0:8: We note that this is an
important parameter and because of that we have conﬁrmed that a value in this range
is also empirically supported (see Guvenen, [13]).
The discount rate is set to 0.01, a value in the range used in the literature. The
depreciation rate of physical capital is also set to be in a lower bound of the interval
usually seen in the literature (0.01). It is usual to see endogenous growth models with
human capital accumulation considering no depreciation of human capital, thus we
also set ±H = 0: Small oscillations in these parameters are not of crucial importance
for our results. For the duplication eﬀect (¸) we have followed Strulik [32] and others
in considering ¸ = 0:5: For the spillover eﬀects, we follow Reis and Sequeira [24] in
considering Á = 0:4, which is an appropriate value for models with human capital
accumulation, as the authors argue.
The parameter that relates the technological intensiveness A with pollution (Â),
the productivity of human capital in the human capital accumulation process (»), and
the weight given to pollution in the utility function (k) are calibrated according to
the following conditions: gDE
Y = 0:0188, u¤
R > 0, and g¤
Y > 0. These conditions give a
single value for » = 0:022588 and a single value for Â = 2:1345: However, given these
values, k can assume any value. Thus, for the eﬀect of pollution in the utility, we have
adopted the value used in Stokey [31], · = 1:2. We also note that » is a reasonable value
comparing to values for the same parameter used in the economic growth literature.
We can also compare the value of Â with evidence for the empirical relationship between
output and pollution. This concept predicts an inverted U-shaped relationship between
the level of income and pollution, usually known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve
(EKC). However, recently, speciﬁc country studies have noted that the relationship
between income and pollutants is almost linear or, for some pollutants, N-shaped.
From Roca et al. [25] we see that the EKC is rejected and the eﬀect of income in
pollution is near 1.2. From Akbostanci et al. [1], we learn that this coeﬃcient for
17Turkey is about 3.5. From Song et al. [29], we see coeﬃcients from 1.5 to 3, in a work
applied to China. Thus, the value of 2.1345 is in the range of plausible values. Finally,
for the eﬀect of technological progress on pollution, ², we use 0.5, meaning that it has
decreasing returns in inﬂuencing pollution. As this parameter governs the externality
of technology on pollution, which we want to focus, we will do signiﬁcant sensitivity
analysis on it.
Table 1 summarizes the benchmark values for calibration.
Table 1 - Parameters Values (Benchmark)
Production and Utility
gY ¯ ±P ¿ ½ ®
0.0188 0.36 0.01 0.8 0.01 0.75
Human Capital and R&D
» ±H ´ ¸ Á °





In this section, we present results for the calibration exercise. First we present the
main economic indicators for the benchmark economy and a comparison with optimal
values.
Table 2 - Statistics for the Benchmark Economy
Decentralized Economy
gY gKH gQR uR uH uY
1.88% 0.78% 0.65% 24% 35% 41%
Optimal Solution
gY gKH gQR uR uH uY
0.00% 1.25% 1.04% 15% 56% 29%
This exercise shows that due to pollution, the social planner wants to decelerate the
economy, leading to an output growth rate of 0% at the equilibrium. However, due to
the eﬀect of technological progress on pollution and of human capital on technological
progress, the social planner solution leads to higher growth rates of human capital
and R&D. This implies that the social planner allocates more human capital to the
human capital production (56%) than the decentralized equilibrium does (35%). Due
to a specially high creative destruction eﬀect that results from our calibration exercise,
18the decentralized equilibrium allocates more human capital to R&D than the social
planner.
As we introduce a new positive externality of R&D in the model, which is explained
by its positive eﬀect on reducing pollution, we want to know the quantitative eﬀect of
this distortion. Thus, we present ﬁgures in which we increase this eﬀect (the parameter
²) and see what happens to the allocations of human capital to the diﬀerent sectors of
the economy.
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Figure 1: Human Capital Allocations to the Diﬀerent Sectors in the decentralized
equilibrium and in the social planner solution
From these ﬁgures, we can show that as the externality of R&D in pollution in-
creases, the optimal allocation of the ﬁnal good decreases to allow an increase in
allocations to the human capital production sector (schools) and to the R&D sector.
We note that the diﬀerence between the social planner and the decentralized equilib-
rium allocation to R&D decreases as ² increases. This means that the positive eﬀect
19of R&D in decreasing pollution decreases the overallocation to R&D that results from
the strong eﬀect of creative destruction. While the initial diﬀerence (for ² = 0) is
above 10%, the diﬀerence for ² = 1 is below 9%.
Due to the fact that gQR depends on ² and that following our calibration strategy °
depends on gQR, as ² decreases ° also decreases, which increases the creative destruction
eﬀect. As this fact results only from the strategy we have followed to calibrate the
model, we want to show a sensitivity analysis in which we kept constant the creative
destruction eﬀect, as the new externality from technological progress on pollution
increases. Thus, we use the value for ° = 1:1 from Strulik [32] (for ² = 0:5, this
implies a lifetime of patents of 50 years, which is on the upper bound of the reasonable
interval), and maintain this value throughout the exercise. The following ﬁgure shows
the results.
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Figure 2: Human Capital Allocations to the Diﬀerent Sectors in the decentralized
equilibrium and in the social planner solution - extension with lower and constant creative
destruction
20This scenario, which clearly decreases the importance of creative destruction as a
distortion of the market economy, shows that the increase in the eﬀect of technological
progress in pollution increases the allocation of human capital to R&D activities in
the social planner solution and converts a situation of initial overinvestment in R&D
to a situation of underinvestment in R&D. This is an important result as it shows the
strength of the new externality introduced in this model in controlling if the decen-
tralized economy is investing in R&D under or above the optimal level. The threshold
level above which the economy underinvests in R&D is ² = 0:3; which is a low threshold
value. This means that it is suﬃcient an improvement of the quality of technologies
in 1% to imply a reduction in pollution of 0.3%, to lead to underinvestment in R&D
in the decentralized equilibrium. An alternative exercise to show the importance of
this externality, would be to depart from the benchmark calibration, to cancel all
other distortions (in uR), and analyze the reasonability of the implied lifetime. Let
® = ´ = 0:64 (which eliminates the specialization externality), ¸ = 1 (which elim-
inates duplication externality), Á = 0 (which eliminates spillovers externality), and
° = 1:076054 (which eliminates the creative destruction distortion) - this implies a
very reasonable lifetime of 21.308.6
This can be understood as an argument in favour of the existence of subsidies to
the development of cleaner technologies.
7 Conclusion
We derive a complex model of endogenous growth with physical capital, human capital,
and technological progress through quality-ladders, to which we add pollution. In par-
ticular, we focus on the eﬀect of technological progress in decreasing pollution, through
the development of cleaner technologies. This follows the idea of Balc˜ ao Reis [?], which
models technological progress, both exogenously and endogenously, and in which the
possibility of discovering a cleaner technology is taken as exogenous. Contrary to that
6In an alternative exercise where the tax rate T is set such as that the growth rates of the
decentralized equilibrium would equalize those of the optimal solution, the implied lifetime would be
22.574, also a reasonable value.
21author, we model the R&D process as a quality-improving technology in which better
qualities are always cleaner qualities, but the impact they have in pollution may diﬀer
a lot.7 Smulders and Gradus [?] also present models in which technological progress
reduces pollution. However, none of these authors made a quantitative evaluation of
their models. We intend to ﬁll this gap in the literature.
The study of the optimality of investment in R&D has been the focus of a large
set of papers. However, none introduces the potential externality that derives from
the eﬀect of technological progress on pollution and studied it quantitatively. We also
contribute to this literature.
We derive growth rates for output, human capital, technological progress, and
pollution both resulting from the decentralized equilibrium and from the social planner
choices. We then identify the diﬀerent distortions in place (spillovers, duplication,
specialization returns, creative destruction, and pollution). We have also implemented
a calibration exercise. From this exercise we conclude that the economy overinvests
in R&D due to a high creative destruction eﬀect. However, we show clear evidence
that the new externality from technological progress to pollution considered in this
model is suﬃciently strong to induce underinvestment in R&D as an outcome of the
decentralized equilibrium. The threshold level for the eﬀect of R&D in pollution above
which underinvestment occurs is relatively low.
An important policy implication of the main result of this article is a justiﬁcation
to subsidize the research in cleaner technologies.
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25A Appendix A - First Order Conditions for the
Decentralized Equilibrium
The choice variables for the consumers are C and HH so the ﬁrst order conditions for




















= ½ + ±H ¡ » (49)
where ¸a is the co-state variable for the budget constraint and ¸
0
H is the co-state
variable for the stock of human capital.
B Appendix B - Human Capital Shares
B.1 Social Planner
We get the share of human capital allocated to school time from equation (2). The
relation between the share of human capital allocated to R&D activities and the share
of human capital allocated to work was found as described below:










26which we substitute into (17) to ﬁnd:









































R , we substitute these two expressions
into (50) to ﬁnd:
˙ ¸R
¸R




























, which we substitute into (51) to get (43).
B.2 Decentralized Equilibrium
As in the previous case, we get the share of human capital allocated to school time
from equation (2).
The relation between the share of human capital allocated to R&D activities and
the share of human capital allocated to work in the decentralized equilibrium was
found as described next. We log-diﬀerentiating equation (34) to get gWH + gKH =
¢
º








We then substitute these two last expressions into (36) to obtain:











Since gWH = g¸
0
H ¡ g¸a = r + ±H ¡ » ¡ ±P and by substituting this expression and
also (32) and (27) - using (4) - into (52) we get equation (45).
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